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Courting Public Opinion 
A lot of what happens before the bench depends on what has appeared on television 
and in the newspapers. To avoid being indicted early by the "public jury," you 
need to consid_er how the press can help, and hurt, your case 
ROSS SANDLER 
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION has as much to do with the media as it does with the law. Public health and ecology issues arise in even the 
smallest environmental controversy, mak-
ing litigation of even modest consequences 
newsworthy. And when the press gets inter-
ested in a case, strange things happen. A 
lawyer's careful briefs and oral arguments 
may be completely undone by a client's me-
dia moves. Or vice versa. A case with little 
chance of success on the merits may become 
threatening and powerful simply because of 
press interest. 
The power of the media has not gone un-
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noticed by environmental litigants. Plain-
tiffs in environmental cases use pleadings 
like press releases. They play to a higher 
court-the court of public opinion-while 
defendants, often mistakenly advised by 
their attorneys to be mum, hope the bad 
news will only be a one-day story. But that 
rarely happens. As a result, press strategy 
inevitably becomes an integral part of litiga-
tion strategy. 
The simple act of filing a complaint in an 
environmental lawsuit is a newsworthy 
event. It is the opening shot, the starting gun, 
the kickoff. Consequently, the plaintiff con-
trols press timing and content. It is the plain-
tiff's moment in the sun because it has the 
chance to tell its s tory in the_most favorable 
light. Prosecutors, attorneys genera l, agency 
heads, and citizen groups all capitalize on 
this fact. They write complaints as source 
material for press releases; indeed, if an alle-
gation appears in the complaint, it becomes 
part of the formal public record and can be 
repeated for the press. 
For example, w hen Alaskan plaintiffs, in-
cluding the Yupik Eskimo Community, su ed 
to halt a 1983 Department of Interior off-
shore lease for oil and gas exploration in the 
Norton Sound Basin, they supported their 
claim of s tanding with an extended descrip-
tion of their use of the Alaskan wa ters. They 
alleged that the watery area of the lease sale 
is "the biological supermarket and spiritual 
cathedral of the Yupik people of Alaska." 
The complaint continued tha t " in recent 
times the dominant society in the United 
States has intruded into Yupik society and 
community life to an ex tent never before 
experienced . In the face of tempting eco-
nomic prizes (jobs, cash, security), the Yupik 
Eskimo people has d etermined to s tead-
fastly withstand these temptations and reaf-
firm a commitment to their Way of Life and 
tribal relationship." Such allega tions are not 
for the defendants; after all, they wou Id have 
little basis on which to affirm or deny them. 
Rather, they are meant to be powerful read -
ing for the press and the public. 
A LlHOUGHFILING A COMPLAINT often creates news, the dismissal of a complaint is almost never news-worthy. Vindica tion is a lonely busi-
ness; there is little chance that anyone will 
hear about a complaint being thrown out of 
court. Moreover, all intermedia te discovery, 
brief writing, and motion practice might as 
well happen on another planet. Unless a 
lawyer commands a ttention in the manner 
of Alan Dershowitz, his or her intrica te argu-
ments and briefs w ill never rise to public 
notice. 
If the defendant wants to get its side be-
fore the public, it need s to be in the firs t 
article that reports the complaint. There are 
rarely follow-up stories. If the defendant an-
nounces "no comment" or "we' re s tudying 
the complaint," it will probably never get a 
second chance. People believe the worst, 
and limp responses confirm guilt. Typica lly, 
defendants will be relegated to the last para-
graphs while the plaintiff's story w ill be re-
peated in detail. But tw o years later w hen 
the victory is the defendant's, no one will 
know. 
Most environmental defendants do not 
win dismissals, especially aga inst govern-
mental plaintiffs. But, since the defendant is 
genera lly aware of a n investiga tion before 
the complaint is fil ed , it has a number of 
options in dealing with the press in order to 
make the best of a poor hand. 
For example, on Jul y 11, 1991, A lcoa 
agreed to pay $3.75 million in criminal fines 
and $3.75 million in civil penalties for haz-
ardous waste viola tions a t its Massena, New 
York, facility. The criminal fine was the larg-
est ever pa id for a hazardous waste viola-
tion . New York A ttorney Genera l Robert 
Abrams, the New York Department of Envi-
ronmenta l Conserva tion, and Alcoa each is-
sued separa te press releases. 
Abrams, pursuing a tough law enforce-
ment image, detai led the viola tions and em-
phasized the record size of the penalty. The 
attorney genera l s tated tha t "Alcoa illegally 
kept quantities of hazardous waste a t the 
site, prepared fa lse documents to conceal 
w hat it was transporting, fa iled to obtain 
required s tate permits, and dumped hazard -
ous solutions into the environment." In fac t, 
Alcoa shipped 33 railroad cars of PCB-con-
taminated soil to Alabama, and admitted to 
dumping hazardous wastes down a man-
hole approximately 2,000 times since 1985. 
Moreover, two Alcoa employees pleaded 
guilty to criminal charges and paid fi nes. 
The same day, Alcoa issued its own sta te-
ment, which is a mod el of how a corpora tion 
can take charge of a disastrous situa tion. The 
s ta tem ent, w hich Alcoa attributed to its 
chairman, Paul H . O'Neill, read : "Alcoa has 
a clear environmental policy which was not 
followed in this instance. The manager of the 
Alcoa plant at Massena firs t identified the 
viola tions tha t formed the basis for this set-
tlement and brought them to the attention of 
New York Sta te offi cials. Since the problems 
were identified , Alcoa has full y coopera ted 
with the Department of Environmental Con-
serva tion and the a ttorney genera l and has 
entered into this agreement becau se it was 
clea r that employees of the company had, in 
fac t, viola ted the law and company policy. 
Under the law, the com pany is responsible 
for wrongful acts by its employees. Alcoa 
has accepted this responsibility. With th is 
unfortunate episode behind us, we can now 
turn our full attention to meeting our envi-
ronmental obliga tions ." 
The Department of Environmenta l Con-
serva tion issued its separa te press release 
w hich read as if Alcoa had won its Environ-
m enta lis t of the Year Award. The initia l 
quote in the DEC press release, attributed to 
Commissioner Thomas Jorling, read , "Al-
coa's fo rthrightness and commitment to 
bring the Massena plant into fu ll com pliance 
with New York's environmental laws under-
scores ou r belief tha t environmen tal protec-
tion and manufacturing activity are full y 
compa tib le." Emphasizing Alcoa's agree-
Ross Sandler is a 
partner with Jones, 
Day, Reavis & Pogue. 
He has worked as a 
senior staff attorney 
with the Natural 
Resources Defense 
Council and as 
commissioner of 
transportation for New 





MARCH / APRIL 1992 • 11 
The power of 








integral part of 
litigation 
strategy. 
ment to install new water pollution abate-
ment equipment, Jorling stated, 'We are 
pleased to have a corporation with such re-
sponsible environmental management op-
erating in New York." As if this were not 
enough, the press release lauded O'Neill for 
reporting the violations to the state-an act 
which, coupled with the guilty plea and con-
sent order, convinced DEC that Alcoa 
"would be a good corporate environmental 
citizen in New York." 
Then the Wall Street Journal carried the 
story. It headlined "Alcoa to pay $7.5 million 
of hazardous waste violations," described 
the charges and the settlement, but quoted 
only one person in the story: Alcoa's Chair-
man O'Neill. The Journal reported that he 
had taken responsibility and had declared 
that the matter was behind the company. 
Although in this case the defendant's press 
strategy did not yield a court victory, it cer-
tainly proved to be face-saving. 
CONTROVERSY OVER DEVELOP-ment projects usually begins with an administrative action, not court action. The battle lines form early, 
often during a public debate before a local 
zoning board, the EPA, the Army Corps of 
Engineers, or a similar agency, or in hearings 
or written comments that may themselves 
attract media attention. The winner is the 
one who succeeds in tacking a pejorative 
label on the other: NIMBYs on one side, 
rapacious developer on the other. Even if the 
opponents can simply cause the project to be 
judged "controversial," they are well on 
their way to success. 
Getting the press to treat a project as con-
troversial is tantamount to overcoming the 
legal harmless error rule: only errors that 
significantly hurt the appellant's case war-
rant reversal. Similarly, if the project is 
deemed controversial, then litigation about 
it becomes significant, and legal or proce-
dural errors are no longer harmless. Judges 
pay closer attention and, right or wrong, 
plaintiffs become worthier of a remedy. Con-
versely, if a project is not controversial, the 
judge will care less about the plaintiff's 
claims. Although plaintiffs do not always 
succeed in this strategy, their odds are im-
proved if the media have already taken their 
cause seriously. 
On the other hand, once a project gets 
labeled as controversial, there is almost no 
power on earth that can alter that image. The 
project passes into that special territory oc-
cupied by such favorites as the Cross Florida 
Barge Canal, the Alaska Pipeline, the Tellico 
Dam, Westway, Mono Lake, the North Slope, 
nuclear power, and hazardous waste dis-
posal sites. The battle lines become fixed like 
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ancient tribal boundaries, and it does not 
matter what particular issue establishes the 
project as controversial. Spotted owls, snail 
darters, striped bass, caribou, whales, rain 
forests, and redwoods all possess intrinsic 
ecological importance and are worth fight-
ing for on the merits. But for litigation, their 
special importance lies in the power to con-
vert an ordinary proposal into a controversial 
proposal. 
The very first modern environmental law-
suit showed the .way. Consolidated Edison, 
New York City's electricity supplier, pro-
posed in September 1962 to build a pumped 
storage hydroelectric plant at Storm King 
Mountain in the Hudson Highlands south of 
Newburgh. It would have been the third 
largest hydroelectric plant in the United 
States. 
The opponents, mostly nearby homeown-
ers, organized. Their first goal was to estab-
lish that they were not just against develop-
ment, but were fighting for an equal and 
perhaps more important value. Calling 
themselves the Scenic Hudson Preservation 
Council, they emphasized the aesthetic 
splendor of the Hudson Highlands and their 
role as the inspiration for the Hudson River 
school of painting, America's most impor-
tant contribution to nineteenth century art. 
They dramatized the highlands' unique his-
tory by organizing a water-borne protest in 
which small boats paraded as a regatta past 
Storm King Mountain. The fleet sailed 
through the historic and scenic water gap, 
and right into the New York Times and other 
national news magazines, which reported in 
picture and story the plucky fight to halt the 
loss of scenic beauty. In one stroke, the op-
ponents raised the recreational and scenic 
resource issue to a level equal to that of the 
region's need for electricity. Consolidated 
Edison's proposal had become controver-
sial. 
In 1965, the Second Circuit Court reversed 
the Federal Power Commission's grant of 
the license, opening its decision with a favor-
able nod to Scenic Hudson's press cam-
paign: "The Storm King project is to be lo-
cated in an area of unique beauty and major 
historical significance. The highlands and 
gorge of the Hudson offer one of the finest 
pieces of river scenery in the world. The 
great German traveler Baedeker called it 
'finer than the Rhine.'" 
From that aesthetic foundation, the court 
held that "recreational purposes . .. un-
doubtedly encompass the conservation of 
natural resources, the maintenance of natu-
ral beauty, and the preservation of historic 
sites." Having made that leap, which here-
tofore had not been at all obvious, the court 
chastised the FPC for not affirmatively pro-
tecting the recreational rights of the public 
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power on earth that can alter that image. The 
project passes into that special territory oc-
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ancient tribal boundaries, and it does not 
matter what particular issue establishes the 
project as controversial. Spotted owls, snail 
darters, striped bass, caribou, whales, rain 
forests, and redwoods all possess intrinsic 
ecological importance and are worth fight-
ing for on the merits. But for litigation, their 
special importance lies in the power to con-
vert an ordinary proposal into a controversial 
proposal. 
The very first modern environmental law-
suit showed the :way. Consolidated Edison, 
New York City's electricity supplier, pro-
posed in September 1962 to build a pumped 
storage hydroelectric plant at Storm King 
Mountain in the Hudson Highlands south of 
Newburgh. It would have been the third 
largest hydroelectric plant in the United 
States. 
The opponents, mostly nearby homeown-
ers, organized. Their first goal was to estab-
lish that they were not just against develop-
ment, but were fighting for an equal and 
perhaps more important value. Calling 
themselves the Scenic Hudson Preservation 
Council, they emphasized the aesthetic 
splendor of the Hudson Highlands and their 
role as the inspiration for the Hudson River 
school of painting, America's most impor-
tant contribution to nineteenth century art. 
They dramatized the highlands' unique his-
tory by organizing a water-borne protest in 
which small boats paraded as a regatta past 
Storm King Mountain. The fleet sailed 
through the historic and scenic water gap, 
and right into the New York Times and other 
national news magazines, which reported in 
picture and story the plucky fight to halt the 
loss of scenic beauty. In one stroke, the op-
ponents raised the recreational and scenic 
resource issue to a level equal to that of the 
region's need for electricity. Consolidated 
Edison's proposal had become controver-
sial. 
In 1965, the Second Circuit Court reversed 
the Federal Power Commission's grant of 
the license, opening its decision with a favor-
able nod to Scenic Hudson's press cam-
paign: "The Storm King project is to be lo-
cated in an area of unique beauty and major 
historical significance. The highlands and 
gorge of the Hudson offer one of the finest 
pieces of river scenery in the world. The 
great German traveler Baedeker called it 
'finer than the Rhine.'" 
From that aesthetic foundation, the court 
held that "recreational purposes ... un-
doubtedly encompass the conservation of 
natural resources, the maintenance of natu-
ral beauty, and the preservation of historic 
sites." Having made that leap, which here-
tofore had not been at all obvious, the court 
chastised the FPC for not affirmatively pro-
tecting the recreational rights of the public 
when it failed to analyze alternatives to the 
project, such as gas turbines and intercon-
nections with other utilities. In short, the 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Council had 
played the press card exactly right. · 
The best press efforts persuade through a 
visually compelling dramatization. A stun-
ning example of this strategy occurred in 
New York City in 1987, when the Municipal 
Art Society and others sued to stop construc-
tion of a city-sponsored three million square 
foot office and residential building at Co-
lumbus Circle, on the southwestern edge of 
Central Park. The developer planned two 
huge towers, one 925 feet high and the sec-
ond 802 feet high. In addition to alleging 
technical violations in the request for pro-
posals and in the contract, the plaintiffs ob-
jected primarily to the project's overwhelm-
ing size, which would cause street conges-
tion and block sunlight from reaching Cen-
tral Park. At first, few observers gave them 
much of a chance for success. But then the 
opponents demonstrated. 
The Municipal Art Society invited sup-
porters to gather in Central Park one Sunday 
at noon to "Stand Against The Shadow." The 
invitation said "Bring A Black Umbrella, 
Rain Or Shine." After a rally, the opponents 
intended to form a line the length of the 
shadow cast by the building. "Starting at 
Columbus Circle," the press release prom-
ised, "participants one after the other will 
open their umbrellas, causing a 'wave' of 
black umbrellas that will reach Fifth Avenue 
and 69th Street. Almost a mile long, the 
shadow that will be created is one that 
would be cast over the Park on March 21 (the 
first day of spring) and September 21 (the 
last day of summer) at 5:00 p.rn. The actual 
shadow will go far beyond the park to Sec-
ond Avenue." 
That Sunday proved brilliantly sunny, and 
a thousand opponents of the project turned 
out. The umbrellas unfurled as planned and 
the press loved it. It didn't hurt that Jackie 
Onassis and Bill Moyers assumed leader-
ship of the protest. The Daily News headlined 
the next day "Shadowy Protest Held." The 
Wall Street Journal printed a long analysis 
headed "Building That Would Shade Cen-
tral Park Draws Quiet Civic Group Into the 
Light." The West Side Spirit declared it was 
"Celebs Vs. The Shadow." Kent Barwick, the 
president of the Municipal Art Society, 
summed up the case: "It was necessary to 
assemble today to protest man's basic right 
to sunlight and air. When you attack Central 
Park, you do so at your own great peril." 
Two months later, the court ruled in favor 
of the opponents, finding that the request for 
proposal and contract had been defective, as 
the plaintiffs alleged. The Shadow was not 
mentioned. The city settled the case with the 
Municipal Art Society by lopping 175 feet off 
the building. But, proving again the rule that 
once a project is controversial, it is always 
controversial, another lawsuit surfaced 
charging the city with a violation of the New 
York City Clean Air Act plan. That case also 
proved successful. Together, the lawsuits, 
along with a general office glut, have kept 
the developer from breaking ground, and 
Central Park remains free of The Shadow. 
I FA PARTY TO AN ENVIRONMENTAL conflict has to buy an advertisement to sell its proposal, then it's probably too late: the project has most likely already 
entered the pantheon of world-class contro-
versial projects. One of the latest inductees 
is Hydro-Quebec's proposal to spend $11.7 
billion to build a series of hydroelectric dams 
and reservoirs on the Great Whale River, 
which flows into Hudson Bay. Because Hy-
dro-Quebec intends to sell a portion of the 
power to users in New York and Vermont, 
the project has become international. 
After a series of adverse news stories, the 
controversy erupted with full-page ads in 
the New York Times. On October 21, 1991, 
opponents of the project headed their ad 
"CATASTROPHE AT JAMES BAY: Destroy-
ing A Wilderness The Size Of France." With 
pictures of drowned caribou and a young 
Cree Indian, the ad summarized its opposi-
tion by declaring the project an "ecological 
catastrophe on a scale with the devastation 
of the Amazon." 
Three days later, Hydro-Quebec re-
sponded with its own full-page ad, which it 
headed "Looking At Facts Rather Than Sym-
bols." Hydro-Quebec said, "Let's Talk Sensi-
bly," pictured live caribou running across a 
frozen reservoir, and showed Crees appar-
ently happily living side by side with "tradi-
tional and modern economics." 
But Hydro-Quebec has been on therunfor · 
some time, in large part because of the low 
cost of competing fuels, but also due to the 
articulate advocacy of Matthew Coon Come, 
the grand chief of the Quebec Crees, who has 
traveled extensively in the United States. 
Three weeks before the battle of the ads, 
Coon Corne declared before a New York leg-
islative hearing that hydroelectric projects 
already in operation were "eating away at 
the soul of my people . . .. The Cree have 
constructed no great earth works and built 
no pyramids, but our grandfathers always 
managed to leave the land as it had been, a 
remarkable achievement." 
With the controversy established, the 
New York State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation announced that for the 
first time it would require a full environ-
mental impact statement on alternatives to 
Once a project 
gets labeled as 
controversial, 
there is no 
power on earth 
that can alter 
that image. 
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the purchase of Hydro-Quebec's power. The 
press campaign therefore succeeded not 
only in labeling the project as controversial, 
but also in erecting an administrative and 
legal hurdle that previously had not existed. 
Environmental law possesses a moral 
force which defendants defy at their peril. 
The Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William 
Sound in March 1989, and the subsequent 
litigation, has been a textbook of lessons in 
this regard. In April 1991, after months of 
negotiations, the federal government and 
Exxon announced a $1.1 billion settlement of 
all federal civil and criminal litigation. Un-
fortunately, the settlement-trumpeted as 
the biggest ever by Attorney General Rich-
ard Thornburgh and EPA Administrator 
William Reilly-was immediately undone. 
The stories reporting the settlement 
quoted a pugnacious and impenitent 
Lawrence Rawl, chairman of Exxon, saying 
that the penalties would have "no signifi-
cant effect on our earnings," which he had 
announced on the same day to be $2.24 bil-
lion for the first quarter of 1991, a 75 percent 
increase over the prior year. From the tim-
ing, it appeared that the penalties were a 
mere slap on the wrist, while Exxon's profit 
bonanza in fact resulted from the price in-
crease accompanying the Persian Gulf war. 
Rawl's bravado exacerbated the unfavor-
able reaction among Alaskans and environ-
mentalists who, even before reading Rawl's 
comments, had a larger view of what justice 
required in the way of both cleanup and 
contrition. This reaction ultimately led the 
Alaska state legislature and the federal 
judge to reject the agreement which had 
been so carefully crafted by the lawyers in 
the Justice Department. 
Six months later, Exxon and the federal 
government reached a new settlement 
which turned out to be remarkably like the 
earlier one. This time the parties had appar-
ently worked out a different role for Rawl. 
He showed up in the federal court in Alaska 
to plead Exxon guilty to a single misde-
meanor for killing migratory waterfowl. 
Also present was the president of Exxon 
Shipping Company, a subsidiary, who 
pleaded guilty for his company to three mis-
demeanors: killing waterfowl, violations of 
the Clean Water Act, and violations of the 
Refuse Act. In return, the prosecution 
dropped four felony and two misdemeanor 
counts. 
Demonstrating contrition by his court ap-
pearance, Rawl went further, saying, in ef-
fect, that the fines hurt. He stated that the oil 
market was too competitive to pass on the 
costs of the fines to consumers, and that 
Exxon's shareholders would be the ones to 
pay. Ironically, a later economic analysis of 
the monetary settlement by the New York 
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Times reported that the second settlement 
was in fact $5.5 million cheaper for Exxon. 
Rawl, when he appeared in the Alaskan 
federal court, was clearly uncomfortable in 
the role of defendant at the dock. The New 
York Times reported that "for the normally 
combative Mr. Rawl, his role as humbled oil 
company chief was unusual. Answering the 
kind of routine questions that judges nor-
mally direct at defendants to insure that they 
understand their rights, Mr. Rawl spoke in a 
barely audible voice." 
The environmentalists remained uncon-
vinced that the settlement fully compen-
sated for the damage caused by the spill, and 
many continued to oppose the settlement. 
This time, however, the agreement held. But 
as one relentless environmentalist said at the 
time, "At least we got to see Rawl before the 
court pleading guilty, mumbling his an-
swers." 
AMAJOR CRISIS FOCUSES MEDIA attention immediately, as the Exxon Valdez accident clearly shows. How the defendant handles the crisis di-
rectly affects subsequent litigation. As im-
ages of oil soft! y rolling over beach rocks and 
dying birds and sea otters filled the evening 
news reports, Rawl failed to issue a com-
ment for a week, and when he did, he 
blamed the Coast Guard and Alaska officials 
for the slowness of the post-spill cleanup. 
During the week of Raw l's silence, the news 
media complained of difficulty in getting 
accurate information. Exxon's public rela-
tions team attempted to brief reporters from 
Valdez, which proved too remote and, cou-
pled with the general difficulty in getting 
news from the area, caused Exxon to issue 
conflicting and late information to reporters . 
On the whole, Exxon appeared distant, dis-
engaged, and unresponsive. 
A month after the spill, pundits of crisis 
management were al ready publishing arti-
cles analyzing Exxon's performance, gener-
ally grading it as poor. The New York Times, 
in a critique of Exxon's actions in the days 
following the spill, reported that the com-
pany violated six "cardinal rules" of crisis 
management. The article singled out for par-
ticular criticism Rawl's decision not to go to 
Valdez immediately and his unavailability 
to the press for a week after the accident. 
One crisis management expert stated that, 
"As phony as it sounds, sending the chair-
man to the scene would have shown genu-
ine concern for what happened there." 
Rawl seemed to agree. In an interview in 
the Wall Street Journal three months after the 
spill, he admitted to waking up in the mid-
dle of the night questioning the decision to 
stay home. He stated that although his in-
stinct had been to head for Alaska, he was 
persuaded not to by a consensus of his fel-
low Exxon executives. According to Rawl, 
they argued that there was nothing for him 
to d o since the company was already d oing 
everything that could be done at the scene 
and had accepted responsibility. Rawl, his 
advisers argued, would just get in the way 
of "people who were already up to their 
necks in alliga tors." 
But with hindsight, it is clear tha t the liti-
ga tion game began for Exxon with its fi rs t 
public statements, before any complaints 
were filed . In a crisis of even moderate mag-
nitude, the public expects the top person to 
take charge and speak for the company. 
When the Exxon tanker grounded on the 
rocks of Prince William Sound, realizing a 
potential accident that had been the subject 
of a long dispute about the risks of transport-
ing oil, everyone a t Exxon should have 
known this was a major league crisis which 
called for the highest corpora te offi cial to 
appear. 
Exxon also erred in not realizing that the 
public has little sympathy for blame-shed-
ding . Exxon blam ed Capta in Joseph J. 
Hazelwood, w ho it sa id may have been 
drinking and not on the bridge at the time of 
the accident. Exxon also criticized the Sta te 
of Alaska and the Coast Guard for sna fu s in 
the cleanup, and, two yea rs after the spill, 
claimed that a fa ulty steering gear may have 
played a role in the grounding. But the pub-
lic only views these as excuses. It expects 
large corporations to anticipate and prepare 
for human error, equipment failure, and in-
ept governmental response. The unique 
facts of a singular event, such as those which 
surrounded the Exxon Valdez oil spill, are not 
exculpatory in the court of public opinion. 
They are merely the predictable risks for 
which the corporation is held accountable. 
H AND LING ENVIRONMENTA L matters requires a knowledge of how the media operate. It means unders tanding th eir d eadlines 
(early in the day for television, la ter for 
print), their definition of news (the hook), 
their need for controversy, and their need to 
tell a story. Six basic rules cons ti tu tea primer 
for dealing with the media effectively. 
First, use care in speaking with local tele-
vision reporters. They are likely to know 
absolutely nothing about your issues. Un-
like many print reporters, TV news reporters 
are not assigned beats and bring little history 
to the interview. They are generalists focus-
ing mainly on crime, wea ther, traffic, sports, 
and poli tics. Television reporters almost 
never specialize in environment or law like 
those reporting on such matters in the New 
York Times or the Washington Post. TV report-
ers w ill know whatever appeared in recent 
press releases and what has been said that 
day. They are looking for good visuals, pithy 
statements, and controversy. For instance, if 
a television reporter had confronted Alcoa in 
the Massena case, the reporte r's lead ques-
tion would be something like: "The attorney 
general says that Alcoa dumped hazardous 
wastes down a manhole a t the plant more 
than 2,000 times since 1985. How could that 
happen?" And the Alcoa response would be 
edited down to about ten seconds in the 
report aired that evening. 
Second, television likes pictures. Probably 
a key reason Exxon's Rawl did not rush to 
Prince William Sound is that he d id not wish 
to be interviewed by television reporters 
with dying sea otters and oil-soa ked beaches 
in the background. But he might have 
agreed to meet reporters in New York City 
when the story broke, w here he would still 
look chairman-like. And since the television 
reporter could not have ignored an opportu-
nity to spea k to the chairman of the board, 
the corpora tion would have been able to 
name the loca tion, and therefore also the 
background. 
Third , television coverage usually follows 
print coverage. If a story appears in print, 
there is the possibility that television news 
will pick it up, but newspapers almost never 
follow up on television stories. Television 
news managers read the morning papers, 
decide w hat fits, and assign reporters. Print 
editors either do not wa tch television or fig-
ure it is a dead story if it has already aired . 
Fourth, the question reporters always ask 
is, "How much will this cos t?" It is as man-
datory as age at dea th in an obituary. Be 
prepared to answer. 
Fifth, editorials constitute a second front. 
Contrary to wha t one would think, a news-
paper's editorial department is usually a . 
completely separate division. These anony-
mous writers will often meet with you to 
hear your ideas for editorials and your views 
on the subject. It is possible to salvage a bad 
situation, or improve your position, by teas-
ing the interest of a writer into writing a 
fa vorable editorial. But be prepared: ed ito-
rial w riters are by na ture analytical, and 
good record-keepers. They will check facts 
with your adversaries, and they have the 
time to pull up all the clips of past articles. If 
you mislead them they do not forget, and 
they ca n repea tedly attack from the high 
ground of disinterested wisdom on which 
they sit. 
Last, tell the truth. One is constantly sur-
prised by how little truth ever gets told . 
Reporters will likely fi nd it refreshing, think 
you are rare and specia l, and maybe even 
give you a break. O 
A lthough filing 
a complaint 
often creates 
new s, the 




Vindication is a 
lonely business. 
MARCH / APRIL 1992 • 15 
